

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE
WESTERN DIVISION

FILED BY *eg* D.C.
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THOMAS M. GOULD
CLERK, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
W/D OF TN, MEMPHIS

DOUGLAS TINDALL,

Plaintiff,

vs.

SHELBY COUNTY, et al.,

Defendants.

X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

No. 05-2264-M1/P

ORDER CORRECTING THE DOCKET
ORDER ASSESSING \$250 FILING FEE
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
ORDER CERTIFYING APPEAL NOT TAKEN IN GOOD FAITH
AND
NOTICE OF APPELLATE FILING FEE

Plaintiff Douglas Tindall, RNI number 72879, an inmate at the Shelby County Detention Center ("SCDC")¹ in Memphis, filed a pro se complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on April 8, 2005, in connection with his previous confinement at the Shelby County Criminal Justice Complex ("Jail"). The Court issued an order on April 25, 2005, directing the Plaintiff, within thirty days, to comply with the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a)-(b), or pay the \$250 civil filing fee. Plaintiff submitted the appropriate documentation on May 20, 2005. The Clerk

¹ The word "prison" is used in this order to refer to all places of confinement or incarceration, including jails, penal farms, detention and classification facilities, or halfway houses.

(4)

shall record the Defendants as Shelby County² and Correctional Medical Services, Inc.

I. Assessment of Filing Fee

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PLRA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), all prisoners bringing a civil action must pay the full filing fee of \$250 required by 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a).³ The in forma pauperis statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), merely provides the prisoner the opportunity to make a "downpayment" of a partial filing fee and pay the remainder in installments.

In this case, Plaintiff has properly completed and submitted both an in forma pauperis affidavit and a trust fund account statement. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), it is ORDERED that the Plaintiff cooperate fully with prison officials in carrying out this order. It is further ORDERED that the trust fund officer at Plaintiff's prison shall calculate a partial initial filing fee equal to twenty percent (20%) of the greater of the average balance in or deposits to the Plaintiff's trust fund account for the six months immediately preceding the completion of the affidavit. When the account contains any funds, the trust fund officer shall collect them and pay them directly to the Clerk of Court. If the funds in Plaintiff's account are insufficient to pay the full amount of the

² The Court construes the Plaintiff's allegations concerning 201 Poplar Avenue, the address of the Jail, as an attempt to assert a claim against Shelby County.

³ Effective March 7, 2005, the civil filing fee increased to \$250 from \$150.

initial partial filing fee, the prison official is instructed to withdraw all of the funds in the Plaintiff's account and forward them to the Clerk of Court. On each occasion that funds are subsequently credited to Plaintiff's account the prison official shall immediately withdraw those funds and forward them to the Clerk of Court, until the initial partial filing fee is paid in full.

It is further ORDERED that after the initial partial filing fee is fully paid, the trust fund officer shall withdraw from the Plaintiff's account and pay to the Clerk of this Court monthly payments equal to twenty percent (20%) of all deposits credited to Plaintiff's account during the preceding month, but only when the amount in the account exceeds \$10.00, until the entire \$250.00 filing fee is paid.

Each time that the trust fund officer makes a payment to the Court as required by this order, he shall print a copy of the prisoner's account statement showing all activity in the account since the last payment under this order and file it with the Clerk along with the payment.

All payments and account statements shall be sent to:

Clerk, United States District Court, Western District of
Tennessee, 167 N. Main, Room 242, Memphis, TN 38103

and shall clearly identify Plaintiff's name and the case number on the first page of this order.

If Plaintiff is transferred to a different prison or released, he is ORDERED to notify the Court immediately of his

change of address. If still confined he shall provide the officials at the new prison with a copy of this order.

If the Plaintiff fails to abide by these or any other requirements of this order, the Court may impose appropriate sanctions, including a monetary fine, without any additional notice or hearing by the Court.

The Clerk shall mail a copy of this order to the prison official in charge of prison trust fund accounts at Plaintiff's prison. The Clerk is further ORDERED to forward a copy of this order to the Director of the SCDC to ensure that the custodian of the Plaintiff's inmate trust fund account complies with that portion of the PLRA pertaining to the payment of filing fees.

The obligation to pay this filing fee shall continue despite the immediate dismissal of this case. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). The Clerk shall not issue process or serve any papers in this case.

II. Analysis of Plaintiff's Claims

The complaint alleges that, on May 15, 2004, Plaintiff went to the medic complaining of chest pain. The nurse on duty checked his vital signs and sent him back to his housing area. A few minutes later, the Plaintiff could not breathe so prison officials called a code white. Plaintiff was returned to the medical unit, where the nurse gave him something for gas and returned him to his cell. According to the complaint, "Now i [sic] keep on tell [sic]

them i couldn't breve [sic] but they just sent me back to the annex J pod. This happen for three days."

The plaintiff seeks monetary compensation and the firing of the nurses who failed to provide appropriate medical care.

The Sixth Circuit has held that 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) requires a federal court to dismiss a complaint without prejudice whenever a prisoner brings a prison conditions claim without demonstrating that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102 (6th Cir. 1998); see Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 532 (2002) ("[T]he PLRA's exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some other wrong."); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (prisoner seeking only money damages must exhaust administrative remedies although damages are unavailable through grievance system). This requirement places an affirmative burden on prisoners of pleading particular facts demonstrating the complete exhaustion of claims. Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir. 2000). To comply with the mandates of 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),

a prisoner must plead his claims with specificity and show that they have been exhausted by attaching a copy of the applicable administrative dispositions to the complaint or, in the absence of written documentation, describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome.

Id. at 642; see also Boyd v. Corrections Corp. of Am., 380 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th Cir. 2004) (describing the standard for demonstrating

exhaustion when prison officials fail to respond in a timely manner to a grievance), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 1639 (2005); Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486 (6th Cir. 2002) (prisoner who fails to allege exhaustion adequately may not amend his complaint to avoid a sua sponte dismissal); Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 503-04 (6th Cir. 2001) (no abuse of discretion for district court to dismiss for failure to exhaust when plaintiffs did not submit documents showing complete exhaustion of their claims or otherwise demonstrate exhaustion). Furthermore, § 1997(e) requires the prisoner to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing suit and, therefore, he cannot exhaust these remedies during the pendency of the action. Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641, 645 (6th Cir. 1999). Finally, the Sixth Circuit recently held that district courts are required to dismiss a complaint in its entirety, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), that contains any unexhausted claims. Jones Bey v. Johnson, No. 03-2331, 2005 WL 1120283, at *3-*6 (6th Cir. Apr. 27, 2005) (to be published in the Federal Reporter).

In this case, the Plaintiff has not satisfied the burden of demonstrating that he exhausted his administrative remedies. The Complaint alleges that he "[f]iled 7-10 grievances" and "the Disposition Code was G on 8-30-04." At the Jail, a disposition code of "G" means only that the matter presented in the inmate grievance is grievable. The Complaint does not set forth the response of the grievance officer and does not allege that the Plaintiff appealed any unfavorable disposition.

The Sixth Circuit has stated that "[a] plaintiff who fails to allege exhaustion of administrative remedies through 'particularized averments' does not state a claim on which relief may be granted, and his complaint must be dismissed sua sponte." Baxter, 305 F.3d at 489.⁴ Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES the Complaint in its entirety, without prejudice, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).

III. Appeal Issues

The next issue to be addressed is whether Plaintiff should be allowed to appeal this decision in forma pauperis. Twenty-eight U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) provides that an appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith.

The good faith standard is an objective one. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). An appeal is not taken in good faith if the issue presented is frivolous. Id. Accordingly, it would be inconsistent for a district court to determine that a complaint should be dismissed prior to service on the defendants, yet has sufficient merit to support an appeal in forma pauperis. See Williams v. Kullman, 722 F.2d 1048, 1050 n.1 (2d Cir. 1983). The same considerations that lead the Court to dismiss this case for


⁴ As the Sixth Circuit explained, "If the plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, he may always refile his complaint and plead exhaustion with sufficient detail to meet our heightened pleading requirement, assuming that the relevant statute of limitations has not run." Id.

failure to state a claim also compel the conclusion that an appeal would not be taken in good faith.

It is therefore CERTIFIED, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal in this matter by Plaintiff is not taken in good faith and Plaintiff may not proceed on appeal in forma pauperis.

The final matter to be addressed is the assessment of a filing fee if Plaintiff appeals the dismissal of this case.⁵ In McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997), the Sixth Circuit set out specific procedures for implementing the PLRA. Therefore, the Plaintiff is instructed that if he wishes to take advantage of the installment procedures for paying the appellate filing fee, he must comply with the procedures set out in McGore and § 1915(b).

IT IS SO ORDERED this 30 day of June, 2005.


JON PHIPPS McCALLA
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

⁵ Effective November 1, 2003, the fee for docketing an appeal is \$250. See Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, ¶ 1, Note following 28 U.S.C. § 1913. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1917, a district court also charges a \$5 fee:

Upon the filing of any separate or joint notice of appeal or application for appeal or upon the receipt of any order allowing, or notice of the allowance of, an appeal or of a writ of certiorari \$5 shall be paid to the clerk of the district court, by the appellant or petitioner.

28 U.S.C. § 1917.



Notice of Distribution

This notice confirms a copy of the document docketed as number 4 in case 2:05-CV-02264 was distributed by fax, mail, or direct printing on July 1, 2005 to the parties listed.

Douglas Tindall
72879
1045 Mullins Station Rd.
Memphis, TN 38134

Honorable Jon McCalla
US DISTRICT COURT